



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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Britain's Problems Overseas

by William W. Wade

Differing views on many major problems of foreign policy threaten to cause friction between the United States and Britain at a time when each country is undergoing the stresses of internal political rivalry. While some of the differences are not fundamental, at least one—the clash between British and American attitudes toward the Far East—is deep-seated and persistent. Although British public men are cautiously avoiding statements or actions respecting the Far East which might affect the Presidential campaign here, the tenseness of the struggles for power within the Labor party and between the Laborites and the Conservatives may end this restraint.

Like the United States, Britain has been concerned in recent weeks with events in the Middle East. The trend in London has been to regard both the abdication of King Farouk in Egypt and the turmoil in Iran as opportunities to retrieve some of the losses incurred in these two countries during the past year. Since the military coup of Major General Mohammed Naguib in Egypt on July 23 Britain has been reported ready to push a new proposal for joint Middle Eastern defense. This, a suggested planning staff rather than

an outright military command, would be more tentative than the plan for a Middle East command put forward last November by the United States, Britain, France and Turkey. It might, therefore, have more chance of acceptance in Cairo. Washington, however, has not yet supported this new approach.

The United States seems to be more apprehensive about the Communist threat to Iran than the British. Since Teheran's expulsion of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company last summer, Britain has played a waiting game, trusting that Iran's inability to market oil abroad would force Premier Mohammed Mossadegh or his successor to come to terms. Washington, however, remains concerned lest the policy of economic attrition deliver Iran into the hands of the Communist Tudeh party.

The heart of Anglo-American difference is the crosscurrent of opinion about the Far East, especially as it impinges upon the domestic politics of both countries. A case in point was British criticism in June of the American bombing of points along the Yalu River in the Korean war. Although this criticism has subsided, the conditions for a renewal of the dispute still exist. The left wing

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of the Labor party, led by former Minister of Health Aneurin Bevan, is ready to press any attack against so-called American "adventurism" in Korea, and events have shown that this charge of adventurism is capable of evoking some sympathetic attention in circles well removed from the Bevanite camp. The British appear to be sanguine about prospects for a Korean truce, and if the protracted negotiations at Panmunjom should end in success, a new debate about the status of Communist China probably will be joined.

The British public, as American observers have pointed out, is not well-informed on the Korean war. It pays less attention to this theater of conflict than do Americans. The British contribution of troops to the UN effort is not negligible, but there are other troubled areas which press equally hard on the extended commitments of British foreign policy. This fact in itself is a source of Anglo-American friction.

Bevan vs. Attlee

How influential over foreign policy Bevan really is, remains to be shown in the future. Former Prime Minister Clement Attlee is in his 70th year. Two of his leading lieutenants, Ernest Bevin and Sir Stafford Cripps, are dead. The Labor party is now in opposition, and Mr. Bevan shines in opposition. It is not surprising that he makes the most of his critical talents, especially when the Conservatives seem uncertain of themselves on domestic policy and appear to be losing favor with the voters (if the local elections of last

spring are significant). Bevanism has therefore made some gains in the Labor hierarchy and has pushed the moderate wing farther to the left. Mr. Attlee, however, still commands respect, especially among the Labor members of Parliament, the real core of the party. And Mr. Churchill's Conservatives still hold office and are not likely to submit to a new election much before 1955 if they can avoid it.

What might shorten their period in-office is Britain's persistent economic problem. Recent figures show a halt in the serious drain on the sterling area's gold and dollar reserves which took place last year and during the first quarter of 1952, but the reserves are still substantially below the so-called \$2 billion danger point. Britain, therefore, continues to face the double dilemma of "export or expire" and "arm or appease." It can take either road to ruin—economic insolvency or failure to join in the West's struggle for strength against the Communist challenge—without self-contradiction, but it cannot both export and arm without drastic consequences to its standard of living. Only one loophole has been found among these barriers—Britain can earn a limited amount of foreign exchange by exporting armaments to its neighbors.

Britain's economic weakness affects foreign policy in other ways. In striving for a German settlement, for example, London is concerned about who is to pay the costs of the defense of Western Germany and is reluctant to maintain its present garrison beyond the Rhine. Britain could expect to be far better off diplomatically not

only in the Middle East but also in Africa and Asia if it possessed the bankroll for trade and investment it had before World War II.

Weakened Position Abroad

Amid these troubles, new and old, the Soviet Union is implying that it might be preparing to play a more active and subtle role than in the past. The Moscow economic conference earlier this year dangled before London the bait of Eastern markets at a time when Japanese and German competition was cutting into Britain's trade. The Communists' latest propaganda gambit, the charge of germ warfare in the Korean war, is directed against the United States alone rather than the "Anglo-American imperialists." And there has been speculation that the appointment of Andrei A. Gromyko, who has been the Kremlin's deputy foreign minister, as ambassador to London means that Moscow is singling out Britain for special attention.

The potential success of this strategy, if it is actually a new Russian design, has yet to be proved. When the Labor party took office in 1945 the government soon found itself confronted with hostile Russian challenges in Iran and over the Greek and Indonesian situations, and it forged resolute policies which helped develop Western unity. Deeds, rather than words, will be necessary before Mr. Gromyko begins to reverse this trend.

(Mr. Wade, former editor of the *Headline Series* and a contributor to the *Foreign Policy Bulletin* on developments in Britain, is now engaged in public relations work.)

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New Search for Consistency

A useful legacy that President Truman intends to pass on to his successor is a study of contradictions in United States foreign policy. On August 21 a special group of his advisers appointed Daniel W. Bell to take charge of an inquiry into conflicts in this country's various international economic programs. Mr. Bell, president of a bank in Washington, D.C., formerly was director of the budget and was chief two years ago of a special economic mission to the Philippine Republic. His study may encourage the next President and future Congresses to eliminate some of the major inconsistencies in America's approach to world affairs.

The inconsistencies often bewilder our allies. The proliferation since 1945 of laws on foreign policy and on domestic policy affecting foreign relations has created by now a pressing need for codification of those laws for the sake of harmony.

Tariff Policy vs. Foreign Policy

The principal immediate aim of the President in Mr. Bell's assignment is said to be to redesign American tariff policy in order to make it a buttress of the foreign policy of building up the strength of the West. In some respects present tariffs and the protectionist spirit burgeoning in certain parts of the country undermine the policy of strength. They undermine it at home, as the President's Raw Materials Commission noted in its report in June, by raising the costs of critical strategic materials necessary for defense which the United States must buy in increasing quantities abroad. They undermine it overseas by limiting the ability of countries to which the United States

gives dollars—through the Mutual Security Program—to earn dollars of their own by selling their produce in the United States.

President Truman concretely demonstrated his own opposition to tariff restrictionism when on August 14 he turned down the recommendation of the Tariff Commission for an increase in the duty on Swiss watches. Earlier the President had shown his concern over the conflict between tariffs and foreign aid by charging the Public Advisory Board of the Mutual Security Administration with the task of examining the tariff problem. Mr. Bell is responsible directly to this board.

Contradictions in American foreign policy go beyond the conflicts between tariffs and foreign aid. Traditional American conceptions about the philosophy of international trade bear re-examination. During and immediately after World War II the executive branch of the Federal government urged on the rest of the world the proposition that every country should have "equal access" to sources of materials. This point of view harmonized with the tradition that low tariffs (which the executive branch then and now espoused) are a corollary of freedom in international trade. During the past two years, however, the West's rearmament drive has brought out the fact that full freedom in trade damages many countries while it helps others. The policy of free access means that the materials go to the nations able to pay the highest prices, with only scraps left for those that must be thrifty. In order to ration scarce materials equably, the United States and Western European countries have

worked out a scheme of international allocations. But the theory of trade has not yet caught up with this practical development. The participants in the Bell study face the question of how to restate American theory to accommodate low tariffs to restraint of full freedom in trade. From the point of view of those responsible for present American foreign policy, the trade issue apparently is not whether trade is to be free or controlled but whether controls are to be national or international.

East-West Trade a Problem

Another source of contradiction for Mr. Bell to scrutinize is present American policy toward East-West trade. The policy is set by the Battle Bill of 1951, which gives the Administration discretion to withhold foreign aid to countries that trade in critical materials with the Soviet Union and its allies. In practice this means the Administration requests the aided countries to give up trade arrangements which seem to fall under the ban of the law, so that those countries may continue to receive aid.

Nations friendly to the United States find that sometimes the policy based on the bill (and actually worked out before the passage of the bill) seems to harm them as much as it harms the Soviet. Austria, for example, since May 1951 has had an agreement with Czechoslovakia whereby it processes tungsten ore for the latter. The Czechs send the ore (mined in China) into Austria. The deal enables the West to receive raw materials from the East instead of vice versa, because Czechoslovakia pays for the processing by leaving

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Foreign Policy in the Presidential Campaign

THE REPUBLICAN POSITION

by John Foster Dulles

Mr. Dulles, Republican, was United States Senator from New York in 1949. He was a member of the United States delegations to the United Nations and the Council of Foreign Ministers (1945-1950) and negotiator of the Japanese peace treaty and Pacific security treaties (1950-1951).

THE Republican party, as the "opposition" party, had a duty to cooperate with the good, to criticize the bad and to offer what is better. This we have done.

I

The danger from abroad can only be met by policies which command unity at home. So, Republicans have indispensably helped the Administration wherever it had positive policies, as in Europe and Japan. Yet the Democrats' platform of 1952, like that of 1948, wholly ignores Republican contributions, and claims 100 percent partisan credit for bipartisan results.

Cooperation cannot indefinitely survive such political abuse.

Republicans, in power, will create and preserve essential unity by promoting bipartisanship to a respected status.

II

The Administration, with Republican help, has conducted some commendable holding and rearguard actions. But these are no substitute for the vision, inspiration and initiative needed to prevent the peril from steadily mounting.

At the close of World War II Russia was weak and devastated, while our power and prestige were unprecedented. Yet within seven years our avowed enemies have taken over all or part of 18 independent nations; they now rule one-third of the human race and are forging the most menacing and implacable build-up of hostile power that any nation has ever had to face. Meanwhile, they use satellites to bleed us in Korea.

In 1945 we had won supreme se-

curity. Today, as President Truman said on April 18, 1952, we are "in deadly peril." The Democrats' platform boasts of their "successful policies" since 1945 and asserts that America must "not deviate" from these policies.

Those who see this postwar period as a "success" story are too blind for leadership. And they are patently dishonest when, with no foreign policies except those that require \$60 billion a year of unproductive military expenditure and that have brought us into the Korean war and the deepening shadow of atomic war, they blandly promise our people "a better and more rewarding life."*

III

The Republican party offers a fresh approach.

1. We would have balanced, rather than lopsided, policies.

There will be no relaxing of concern for Western Europe. Our platform commits us to aid that "vital area"† to become strong through collective measures. That program is well under way, thanks to the vision and leadership of General Dwight D. Eisenhower. It will be completed under President Eisenhower.

However, Europe is no more defensible alone than is the United States. It is wrong and dangerous to treat the peoples of the Far East, Middle East, Africa and South America as second-class, "expendable" members of the free world. In answer to a menace that is global, there must be a response that is global.

* Democratic platform

† Republican platform

2. We offer policies which, in quality, are dynamic, not merely static.

The only effective check on aggressive despotism, short of general war, is a resistant spirit within the captive peoples. The Administration's negative and futile policy of "containment" has snuffed out that spirit, helped the despots to consolidate their rule, and thus made aggressive war more likely.

A Republican Administration will treat liberation as a practical goal. We shall again make our nation what it has historically been—the despair of despots and the hope of the oppressed. As we thus resume our traditional role, the peril will begin to end.

3. "We shall support the United Nations."† The Administration treats the United Nations as a plaything. It annually promotes new procedures and more resolutions, but never gives them serious content. Consequently, United Nations prestige is steadily declining. A Republican Administration will develop the vast possibilities of the United Nations for peace and justice.

4. What we do we shall do "without endangering the economic health and sound finances of the United States."†

We shall avoid profligacy, not only because the Russian despots openly count on our bankruptcy but because masses of money rarely produce the best results. No nation has ever bought good will or hired security, and attempts to do so are symptoms of decadence.

† Republican platform

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THE DEMOCRATIC POSITION

by John J. Sparkman

Senator Sparkman, of Alabama, Democratic candidate for the Vice Presidency this year, has served since 1946 in the United States Senate, where he is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. He was a United States delegate to the United Nations in 1950.

THE objective of our foreign policy, to put it simply, is to build a friendly world. The main obstacle to our purposes, of course, is the hostile and aggressive imperialism of the Soviet Union. The best way to check Soviet expansionism and to preserve peace is to develop the collective strength of the free peoples. This is the simple thesis to which the Democratic foreign policy plank is dedicated.

This foreign policy at present involves us in four great areas of activity: (1) the arming and support of our active allies in Europe and Asia and elsewhere—including, especially, resistance to aggression in Korea; (2) technical and economic cooperation with the underdeveloped areas; (3) the steady strengthening of the United Nations as the world's instrument for peace; and (4) the vigorous prosecution of affirmative policies, both to rally our friends on this side of the Iron Curtain and to reassure those on the other side that they have not been forgotten.

These policies and programs powerfully discourage Soviet armed aggression. More than that, they are projecting the great positive strength of the United States and the democratic idea. By showing that the free nations can build a better life for the ordinary people of the world, we not only unite our friends behind us; we also increase the discontent of the peoples behind the Iron Curtain. As the strength and unity of the free world increases, we move toward that position of strength from which, at last, effective negotiations with the Soviet Union will become possible.

A key object of such negotiation must be agreement on an enforceable plan to reduce and control all armed forces and armaments, which would enable all countries, large and small, to be secure in their freedom and independence.

This is the framework of our Democratic foreign policy. With this broad framework, our opponents have found it difficult to quarrel. But under the guise of agreement they have sometimes persisted in policies of disagreement. And, under the guise of disagreement, they have sometimes done their best to conceal the fact of their agreement. Let me illustrate both these things from my own experience:

I

One of the favorite devices of those who really oppose a given policy but fear to acknowledge their opposition is the "economy" device. How many times in the Senate I have seen a policy approved in general and slashed in particulars! Are our schizophrenic opponents perhaps to endorse collective security, economic development and the United Nations and then to refuse the appropriations which give them substance? It wouldn't be the first time that they have written "constructive" preambles and destructive titles.

II

We have heard a good deal lately to the effect that containment is negative, unhelpful, unaffirmative and even immoral. Just what is this all about—in addition to a transparent effort to capitalize on the sorrows

and anxieties of the Polish, German, Czech, Ukrainian, Hungarian and other national groups who have made their homes here but who fear the safety of relatives and friends behind the Iron Curtain?

Of course the United States cannot and will not abandon these peoples. We have repeatedly affirmed our hopes for their liberation. But there are two ways to free them. One is to initiate a war of liberation—a course rejected by everyone in his senses. The other is to create a situation of moral, political, economic and military strength in the free nations. Only our strength can attract and embolden the restless and friendly millions now locked behind the Iron Curtain. It is the essential precondition to peaceful liberation.

But this is already the foreign policy of the Democratic party—a fact which no playing on the word "containment" can conceal. Does the Republican attack on containment mean more than a cynical quest for votes? Or does it mean that the Republican party will generously support the policy of collective strength?

III

What concerns me above all in this election year is the direct relation between what we do at home and what we can do abroad. We cannot, for example, have depression at home and a thriving foreign trade. We cannot helplessly tolerate rural poverty at home and simultaneously tax our people to improve the lot of landless peasants in India. We cannot deny equal opportunity to the minority at home and win the enthusiastic support of the majority of the world in our effort to build a just and lasting structure of peace. We cannot, for reasons of political expediency at home, dictate to our allies and simultaneously win and hold their sincere cooperation in

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Dulles

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The present Administration resorts to spending as the easily improvised answer to every problem. In fact, our foreign relations need, most of all, consistent dependability, and competent planning and execution in an atmosphere of mutual self-respect. When giving is truly needed, we shall give, and encourage the constructive international use of American capital. But money bags will no longer be our first line of defense.

IV

Republican candidates will make these Republican principles into a vital force for our salvation.

The free world today is falling apart and is being picked up by Russian communism, piece by piece. It

cannot be held together by bribes or by compulsions, even the legal compulsion of treaty alliances. Free men are dependably united only by a sense of common destiny which finds concrete expression through leadership that inspires confidence. Of all the nations, only the United States can supply that leadership, and of its men, General Eisenhower uniquely possesses the world-wide prestige and moral authority required to win the peace. That is the compelling reason why General Eisenhower must be our President.

Sparkman

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projects that are at least as important to us as they are to them. In short, if you will permit me some over-

simplification—I do not think it is much—reaction at home means eventual defeat abroad.

This, I believe, is the outstanding issue of the campaign: Will the domestic policies of the Republican party contribute to our survival and triumph in the struggle with the Soviet Union? Enlightened, forward-looking, constructive domestic policies are desirable for their own sake at any time. In the present world crisis they become well-nigh compulsory for reasons of national security. Only a strong America—strong in its economy, strong in its devotion to its fundamental political principles, strong in its understanding, strong in the defenses—can earn and keep the leadership of free peoples in the fight for peace.



FPA Bookshelf

BOOKS ON U.S. POLICY

Documents on American Foreign Relations, Vol. XII, 1950, edited by Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1951. \$6.

This most recent of a 12-volume series published for the World Peace Foundation is a skillful compilation of the most important documents on American foreign relations of 1950. Included is material pertaining to the hostilities between Communist forces and the West, the use of collective action by the UN to resist aggression, and the integration of Western policy under NATO. Excellent as reference material.

American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, by George F. Kennan. Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1951. \$2.75.

In this small book, which contains lectures delivered under the auspices of the Walgreen Foundation as well as two earlier articles published in *Foreign Affairs* (one of them the history-making "X" article outlining the policy of containment), Mr. Kennan, recently appointed ambassador to Moscow, sums up his conclusions about the course of United States foreign policy during the past half-century. Reaching conclusions which differ in important respects from those set forth in the "X" article, he strongly deprecates the concept of total victory; questions the moralistic approach to international relations, which he believes

has too often characterized American diplomacy; and advocates a new attitude "toward many things outside our borders that are irritating and unpleasant today—an attitude more like that of the doctor toward those physical phenomena in the human body that are neither pleasing nor fortunate—an attitude of detachment and soberness and readiness to reserve judgment."

From Versailles to the New Deal, by Harold U. Faulkner.

The New Deal and World Affairs, by Allan Nevins.

The United States in a Chaotic World, by Allan Nevins.

Era of Franklin D. Roosevelt, by Denis W. Brogan.

Each of these volumes in the series *Chronicles of America*, published (1951) by the Yale University Press, New Haven, is \$5.

These four volumes, written in readable language and provided with useful brief bibliographies, give an excellent perspective on the long road the United States traveled from the isolationist period of the 1920's to its global participation in World War II.

Is Anybody Listening? — How and Why U.S. Business Fumbles When It Talks with Human Beings, by William H. Whyte, Jr., and the editors of *Fortune*. Drawings by Robert Osborn. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1952. \$3.

A sparkingly amusing inquiry into the

problems Big Business runs into in trying to establish "communication" with employees and the public, with some much-needed sideswipes at the pretensions of "social engineers" who, whether they realize it or not, would drive the United States into an Orwellian world. The chapter on misguided efforts to communicate the American "myth" to other nations is of particular interest to students of foreign policy.

Who's Who in United States Politics and American Political Almanac, edited by Richard Nowinson. Rev. ed. Chicago, Capital House, in association with Macmillan, New York, 1952. \$25.

An excellent election-year reference work including a biographical directory of 10,000 Republican, Democratic and minority party leaders; names, addresses, titles and terms of local, state and Federal officials; a review of past election results as well as party platforms and organization.

One Man's America, by Alistair Cooke. New York, Knopf, 1952. \$3.50.

The well-known British-born journalist, an American citizen since 1941, who reports on the United States for the *Manchester Guardian*, has here collected some of his favorite weekly broadcasts over BBC, which are infused with affectionate understanding of the strengths and foibles of American society.

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A New Phase for NATO

PARIS—France's preoccupation with American "offshore" purchases as a source of rearmament financing, following close on Britain's decision to stretch rearmament on the ground that available funds should be concentrated on new weapons, has pointed up a fundamental problem of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This problem is that a successful peace-time coalition requires the pooling not only of the military resources of the 14 member nations comprising NATO but also of their economic resources, which must underpin the rearmament effort. This, in turn, calls for coordination of their production in order, first, to strike a workable balance between output for defense and output for civilian use and, second, to avoid the expense of duplication of armament production in all of the member nations.

Efficiency vs. Nationalism

From the point of view of efficiency it would seem unwise to have several NATO countries manufacture tanks, for example, when it might be sufficient to entrust tank output to one or two countries which already have the necessary factories and skilled workers. Under ideal conditions the NATO Council, at its new headquarters in Paris, should be free to decide on a proper division of labor in arms production and to allocate both orders and funds (whether supplied from national budget or American financial grants) to the countries designated for specific tasks. Such an arrangement would in fact, appear essential if the Atlantic community is to achieve ultimately the goal of arms standardization.

NATO, however, is operating not

in an ideal world but in a community of nations which, although united in their common purpose to withstand Russian aggression, remain highly sensitive about their sovereignty. Their governments are understandably affected by national problems. Both Britain and France, alarmed by the persistence of internal economic difficulties, seek in increased "offshore" purchases by the United States alleviation for their national economies at the very time when the American Congress, concerned over rising costs and eager to economize, has reduced foreign aid appropriations. Should the United States increase "offshore" purchases in Britain and France at the expense of other NATO members, then Italy, another nation which counts on shoring up its industry, with armament orders, would feel neglected, and it already points to 2 million unemployed as a sign of impending crisis.

In an ideal world perhaps the United States, with its vast industrial potential, should be the principal source of arms for all NATO countries and, also, "offshore" purchases might be regarded as uneconomic. But this concentration in the United States would not only require major readjustment in the economies of individual nations. It would also make them so dependent on the United States that if the flow of arms were cut off by submarine warfare, they would be unable to defend themselves.

The most delicate aspect of this situation is the extent to which the Western European nations have come to think of armament production as an important sector of their economic life and a promising source

of dollars. Assuming that the cold war is to be a long-term feature of the international landscape, this emphasis on armaments in the planning of production and exports may be justified. The nations concerned argue forcibly in its justification. Long-term rearmament, however, requires also long-term budgeting for arms factories. Otherwise the August crisis in France, precipitated by the revelation that the shortage of expected American funds for "offshore" purchases might lead to the closing of factories and to unemployment, could become a recurring phenomenon. Yet long-term armament budgeting is at present made impossible by the practice of Congress to vote Mutual Security appropriations on an annual basis. This practice leaves European governments which rely on American financial aid for rearmament in a feverish state of uncertainty and leads to last-minute reshuffles of national budgets, marked by alarms and recrimination, such as French Premier Antoine Pinay and Defense Minister René Plevin found it necessary to undertake on August 7.

In short, NATO is now entering a phase when it will have to give increasing attention to problems of economic coordination among its 14 members. The NATO secretariat under Lord Ismay is fully aware of this need but must wait for decisions by the national governments before it can go ahead. In the makeshift buildings at the Palais de Chaillot hastily thrown up to house the 1951 United Nations General Assembly, in full view of the Eiffel Tower, the secretariat is hard at work trying to reconcile national aspirations with

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Dean

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the needs of the Atlantic coalition. A striking indication of this new phase is the extent to which military leaders at SHAPE defer to the advice of civilian technicians as to what national economies can do for the common armament effort. Both military and civilians are reassessing the fundamental question: Should the Atlantic community gird itself for military aggression, or should it strengthen its economy so as to withstand internal crises?

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(This is the third in a series of articles on current trends in Western Europe.)

Bolles

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some of the tungsten in Austria. This stimulates Austria's steel industry and helps Austrian employment. Nevertheless, the State Department has raised the question whether the deal violates the Battle Bill. Restrictions on East-West trade need to be offset by intensified trade among Western countries.

BLAIR BOLLES

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America and the Mind of Europe, edited by Lewis Galantier. New York, Library Publishers, 1952. \$2.75.

Ten writers of international reputation present an analytical report on the postwar European mind. Particular attention is given to what contemporary Europeans are

thinking about the United States. A variety of subjects, including art, literature, political and social philosophy, is included. The short volume is preceded by a broad introduction by the editor, which covers the important aspects of mutual international cultural impact.

American Crisis Diplomacy: The Quest for Collective Security, 1918-1952, by Richard W. Van Alstyne. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1952. \$3.50.

"World wars, conducted on the scale of the last one; injure society organically and lead to long periods of readjustment which inevitably spell new friction." Around this thesis the author draws the background and mechanics of our foreign policy. The author is interested more in over-all trends in the shaping of our policies than in isolated incidents and personalities which affect it. In his conclusion he projects courses which United States policy may follow in attempting to gain stability.

The Challenge to Isolation: 1937-1940, by William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason. New York, Harper, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1952. \$7.50.

This admirable work, based on meticulous study of foreign as well as domestic sources, covering a wide range of material and subjected to the pre-publication scrutiny of numerous American experts, offers a mine of detailed information on developments in United States foreign policy as viewed in the context of world events during the critical years between President Roosevelt's "quarantine speech" and the decision to place American destroyers at the disposal of the British. The authors, both distinguished historians, provide objective answers to many controversial questions concerning this turbulent period in American policy-making.

The Struggle for Survival: A Chronicle of Economic Mobilization in World War II, by Eliot Janeway. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1951. \$5.

In a period when the United States must find answers to the problems of long-term preparedness for the cold war, this excellent volume, trenchantly summarizing the World War II experience of the United States, is valuable for both the expert and the thoughtful layman. The author, who

served as mobilization specialist for *Time* and *Fortune*, is business trends consultant to *Newsweek* and adviser to many industries and companies.

A Man of Courage: Robert A. Taft, by Caroline T. Harnsberger. New York, Wilcox and Follett, 1952. \$3.

A warm admirer of the Senator from Ohio writes a friendly biography, in the preparation of which she had the assistance of the Taft family.

The Siberian Fiasco, by Clarence A. Manning. New York, The Library Publishers, 1952. \$3.75.

Professor Manning of Columbia University reappraises American intervention in Siberia, 1918-22, reaching the conclusion that it was "a foolish but not a criminal episode in the confusion of World War I." He contends that, contrary to Soviet assertions, it was not "an act of aggression, of capitalistic imperialism, or of bourgeois greed and hypocrisy."

BOOKS ON GREAT BRITAIN

Closing the Ring, by Winston S. Churchill. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1951. \$6.

This fifth volume by Britain's prime minister, in which he continues his historic narrative of World War II, deals with the period June 1943 to June 1944 and covers events from the invasion of Sicily to the eve of the invasion of Normandy. Intermingling his account with intimate personal recollections, Mr. Churchill dwells chiefly on problems of international relations and reconciliation of differences in military strategy between the Allies.

Irish Nationalism and British Democracy, by Eric Strauss. New York, Columbia University Press, 1951. \$4.25.

According to this author, Ireland has been a major influence on the development of democracy in Britain and the British Empire. In this story of Irish nationalism and Ireland's relations with Britain, Mr. Strauss contrasts the conquest and settlement of America and Ireland and points up the differences of Irish participation in American and British politics. He also discusses Ireland's withdrawal from the Commonwealth and the effects of that action on the possibility of a united Ireland.

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